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This paper models the impacts of market size and team competition for fan base on 
matchday attendance in the English Premier League over the period 1997-2004 using 
a large panel data set. We construct a comprehensive set of control variables and use 
tobit estimation to overcome the problems caused by sell-out crowds. We also 
account for unobserved influences on attendance by means of random effects attached 
to home teams. Our treatment of market size, with its use of Geographical 
Information System techniques, is more sophisticated than in previous attendance 




































 In professional team sports leagues around the world, market size is a 
fundamental determinant of league outcomes, as measured by league standings or 
probability of winning trophies. This proposition is valid for North American leagues, 
where teams (franchises) are typically viewed as trying to maximise profits (Fort and 
Quirk, 1995). It is also valid for European football leagues, even if clubs try to 
maximise an alternative objective such as number of games won (Késenne, 1999). 
Large disparities in market size sometimes induce league authorities to introduce 
cross-subsidisation schemes to transfer resources to smaller clubs. An example of this 
can be found in Major League Baseball where a luxury tax is levied on the largest 
teams, such as the New York Yankees, with the proceeds redistributed to smaller 
teams such as the Kansas City Royals. 
 
At club level, the size of the market generates resources which can be used for 
investment in playing talent. Also, players will tend to gravitate towards teams where 
the extra revenues from their contributions to the team are highest and hence their 
salaries are highest (Burger and Walters, 2003). Again, this migration of talent will 
occur whether teams maximise profits or games won (Kesenne, 1999). 
 
A crucial difference between North American and European sports leagues is that 
North American franchises tend to be allocated centrally by the league and tend to be 
widely dispersed geographically. This quite deliberate policy is designed to protect 
club revenues from competition by ensuring monopoly status for teams in their local 
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markets (see Leeds and von Allmen, 2005, 190-192 for details). In North America, 
leagues are closed (without promotion or relegation) and each league is essentially a 
franchise monopolist working to maximise members’ monopoly profits. There are 
two direct consequences of this. First, franchises can and do migrate. In the National 
Hockey League there has been a steady drift of Canadian franchises to larger markets 
in the United States over the last two decades (Cocco and Jones, 1997). Second, it is 
rare to find more than one team competing with another in the same metropolitan 
area. Indeed, some large metropolitan centres may be without a major league team in 
a particular sport (for example, Los Angeles in American Football). 
 
In European football, restriction on entry to the top tier of a league is primarily by 
promotion and in principle any team can aspire to top tier status. Some leagues do 
impose conditions on stadium suitability but generally entry and exit in the top 
divisions is fluid. Also, it is common to find several teams in major cities competing 
at the top level. For example, London had six teams in the English Premier League in 
2005/6 out of a total of 20.  
 
Hence, market size is a key concept in the literature on economics of professional 
team sports, whether the focus is primarily North American or European. One 
important channel by which market size generates resources for sports teams is 
though gate attendance. In this paper, we examine how and to what extent market size 
determines matchday attendance in the English Premier League. We take explicit 
account of two potential influences. First, we assess the role of local population size 
in determining matchday attendances. Second, we examine the role of competition 
between clubs. Other things equal, including size of local population, we predict that 
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the greater the number of competing clubs in a specific area, the lower will be 
matchday attendance. Our key concepts are market size and competition between 
clubs and each is to be calibrated using Geographical Information System (GIS) 
techniques applied to data from the England and Wales Census of Population 2001. 
Such techniques have received little prior attention in the sports management and 
economics literatures. 
     
The paper is constructed as follows. In section 1 we establish our attendance demand 
model. Section 2 develops our measures of market size and competition between 
clubs. Section 3 deals with estimation issues and presents our data. Section 4 offers 
our empirical results while section 5 concludes. 
 
1. An attendance demand model 
 
Economists’ consumer theory typically generates a demand function for a  
product in which quantity demanded is a function of own price, price of related goods, 
income and tastes.1 Inclusion of ticket price in a model of sports matchday attendance 
creates problems as price data are difficult to obtain and clubs usually have an array 
of prices for different groups of spectators and different types of seating 
accommodation. Consequently, it is common practice for researchers to let club 
intercept terms, or fixed effects, capture unobserved ticket prices. This is the approach 
followed here.2 Moreover, the literature on matchday attendance in team sports tends 
                                                          
1 The notion of substitution between goods induced by relative price variations does not fit comfortably 
into sports fan behaviour. Fans are unlikely to switch allegiance between teams because one team 
offers lower ticket prices than another. However, they may be less inclined to attend when prices are 
perceived as too high and/or alternative activities appear more attractive. 
2 A common problem in many studies of matchday attendance is that price elasticity of demand is often 
estimated to be substantially below unity. A revenue-maximising team would set ticket prices where 
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to emphasise sport-specific characteristics, comprising attributes of the teams 
involved in particular matches and we follow this direction (see Borland and 
Macdonald, 2003, for a comprehensive review of studies of attendance demand in 
various sports). 
   
Our model of attendance demand for a match i between home team j and away team k 
at time t is: 
 
Log attendanceit = f(team supportjk, team qualityjk, outcome uncertaintyi, broadcasti, 
market sizejk, competitionjk)        (1) 
 
Variables identified by jk subscripts are identified separately for home and away 
teams. The characteristics of away teams will be important for matchday attendance 
for two broad reasons. First, the attractiveness of the away team will influence how 
many home fans turn up to the game. Second, fans of the away team will travel to the 
game and the number of these who appear will depend on away team characteristics.3  
 
Under the heading of team support, we first include the log of average home team 
gate from the previous season for home and away teams: log average home 
attendance last and log average away attendance last. The former variable is intended 
to capture the substantial habit persistence of home fans. A hard core of supporters 
                                                                                                                                                                      
price elasticity is unity.  Empirical studies that use ticket price as an explanatory variable run into the 
problem that price variation may be correlated with changes in tastes. Forrest, Simmons and Feehan 
(2002) argue that price elasticities have been understated in the sports economics literature and propose 
a generalised measure of fan costs of attendance which includes travel costs. Applying this measure to 
cross-section fan survey data for 1995/6, they find that price elasticity rises to close to unity for several 
English Premier League clubs.  
3 Interestingly clubs that experience excess demand by home fans still allocate a proportion of seats to 
away firms. This is partly to encourage reciprocal behaviour by rival teams but also to encourage a 
lively atmosphere within the stadium. 
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will turn out to follow their team whatever its fortunes. The size of away team support 
is proxied by the away team’s average attendance in the previous. Since promoted 
clubs will have prior season attendance in the division below, we interact previous 
season attendance with a dummy variable for promoted teams: Promoted* log 
average home attendance last and Promoted* log average away attendance last. 
Some teams have a long tradition of support and we hypothesise that the longer and 
more established is league membership the greater will be home fan attendance. Also, 
longer-established away teams will bring more travelling fans and also be more 
attractive to home fans. 
  
Two variables are constructed to measure length of membership of the Football 
League and these are home membership and away membership.4 Fan support may also 
depend upon distance. This is the Automobile Association measured road distance 
between grounds of home and away team. Distance is a proxy for travel cost. Higher 
travel costs will deter away fans from travelling to a match and will reduce home 
team gates accordingly. Forrest, Simmons and Szymanski (2004) found that distance 
affected both Premier League and Football League gate attendances negatively but 
also found a significant role for distance squared and this is duly inserted here. 
Finally, we include under the set of support variables a dummy variable, derby, to 
indicate matches of intense local rivalry. Examples include Manchester City versus 
Manchester United, Arsenal versus Tottenham and Manchester United versus 
Liverpool. 
 
                                                          
4 This is similar to the notion of team reputation used as an explanatory variable by Czarnitski and 
Stadtmann (2002) in their study of German league football. 
 7
Team quality is measured by two pairs of variables, The quality of team in a season is 
indicated by the relative wage bill of the club i.e. the club’s wage bill divided by 
Premier League average for a particular season. This measure was gleaned from club 
balance sheets summarised in various issues of Deloitte and Touche Annual Review of 
Football Finance. Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), Hall, Szymanski and Zimbalist 
(2002) and Simmons and Forrest (2004) have shown that relative spending on team 
wage bills is a good predictor of team league standings in European football. We 
proceed on the basis that team quality can be reasonably proxied by club wage bills.5 
Home relative wage and away relative wage then capture quality of playing squads of 
two teams in a match. Increases in either of these measures are predicted to raise 
matchday attendance. The home team relative wage measure is constant across a 
season. Short-term variations in team quality are measured by home points and away 
points. These are points accumulated to date of match divided by number of games 
played and are representative of team fortunes in the Premier League at the time of 
the match.  
 
There is a vast literature in sports economics on the impact of outcome uncertainty on 
audience interest in sports. Other things equal, it is argued that greater outcome 
uncertainty should be associated with enhanced audience interest. Yet demonstration 
of this hypothesis is difficult. First, the other things equal caveat is especially 
important here and it is necessary to control for team attributes, including recent 
league performance. Second, a large difference in league standings may be mistakenly 
                                                          
5 The wage bills used here are for the entire club and not just playing staff but the bulk of the wage bill 
is taken up by playing staff. Since the Bosman ruling of 1995, European clubs have removed 
restrictions on the player labour market making this more competitive. The remaining restrictions are 
first, that movement of players who are under 24 and within their agreed contract period may entail a 
transfer fee payable by the receiving club and second, that work permit restrictions apply for players 
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attributed to outcome uncertainty when in fact the host team has home advantage. 
This means that a home team placed several positions below an opponent still has the 
greater chance of winning the game due to home field advantage.6 A measure of 
outcome uncertainty that corrects for inherent home advantage is the absolute value of  
total number of points divided by maximum gained at home by all teams in the 
Premier league in the previous season minus total number of points divided by 
maximum gained away by all teams plus home team points per game to date minus 
away team points per game to date. This measure was successfully applied by Forrest, 
Simmons and Buraimo (2005) to show that outcome uncertainty had a significant, 
positive impact on TV audiences for Premier League football. We use this measure in 
our attendance demand model. Attempts to show that outcome uncertainty affects 
matchday attendance in sports have yielded mixed results, however (Borland and 
Macdonald, 2003; Szymanski, 2003). It is not at all obvious that closeness of contest 
should affect matchday attendance when the crowd is overwhelmingly partisan and is 
primarily concerned with a victory for a team of its allegiance.   
 
Some Premier League games were broadcast live over our sample period by the 
satellite provider Sky Sports. Other things equal, broadcast matches should lower 
matchday attendance as some fans swap the comfort (and lower cost) of viewing at 
home or in a pub for attendance at the ground. Indeed, Sky recognises the potential 
loss in gate revenues for clubs whose games are broadcast live by offering a 
substantial ‘facility fee’ which more than compensates the clubs for loss of gate 
revenues (Forrest, Simmons and Szymanski, 2004). Here, we establish a set of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
from non-European Union countries. Overall, we expect that a player’s salary will be a good reflection 
of  his expected contribution to team performance and revenues.  
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dummy variables to capture the effects of live broadcasting on attendance. Most live 
telecasts are on Sunday and Monday so Sunday TV and Monday TV are indicators for 
such events. Bank Holiday TV and Other TV indicate telecasts on public holidays and 
not on Sunday or Monday. Teams that have games broadcast on Monday night would 
lose attendance through scheduling away from the weekend at night, even without the 
telecast. Hence, we control for scheduling by a dummy variable Weekday set equal to 
one for games played but not televised over the Monday to Friday period. 
 
Our set of control variables also includes month and year dummy variables and a 
dummy variable for games played on public holidays (bank holiday).  
 
Although interesting in their own right, all variables constructed thus far are merely 
control variables and are secondary to our main concerns which are the effects of 
market size and team competition on gate attendance. In the next section, we show 
how GIS methods are used to generate measures of market size and team competition 
for fans.  
 
2. Measuring market size and competition for fans 
 
Population information is taken from the 2001 census survey of England and  
made available by the Office of National Statistics. Our data set covers attendances at 
Premier League games between the 1996/97 and 2003/04 seasons but population 
measures are time-invariant. We do not expect that population changes would be 
sufficiently large as to undermine the validity of our population measures. Our 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 Home field advantage is a bundle of attributes including home team psychology, greater familiarity 
with pitch, passionate home fans and susceptibility of referees to home crowd pressure.  Around 48 
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Premier League data cover three seasons on either side if the census survey as well 
the season in which the census was conducted.  
 
Population data are available at various levels for England and Wales, including 
county, local authority and ward. We construct our market size measure by first using 
the smallest level, the output area. This gives a very detailed picture of population as 
the average number of people within an output area is 297 with a standard deviation 
of 71. We then count the number of individuals within output areas that lie within 
specified distances from each team’s stadium. Concentric rings are derived using the 
GIS programme, Mapinfo. These rings increase by five mile radii up to a maximum of 
30 miles. Market size is then the log of population within a particular ring zone and 
we experiment with radial distances in the empirical specification. A clue as to what 
can be expected is to be found in Forrest, Simmons and Feehan (2002). Using fan 
survey data and the same method of constructing concentric rings around stadia (with 
1991 census of population data) they found that the relationship between attendance 
and distance travelled by supporters was best fitted using a gravity model, sharp 
reduction in support as distance travelled increased. The majority of home fans lived 
within 10 miles of the stadium. The use of five mile intervals for the width of 
concentric rings preserves homogeneity of travel costs within each zone. In our case, 
we lack precise travel cost information for fans so it is important that the assumption 
of homogeneous costs can be sustained. 
 
Fans do not switch easily between support for neighbouring clubs. Once allegiance is 
established, the critical decision becomes whether to attend or not. But support tends 
                                                                                                                                                                      
percent of games in English football are won by the home team. 
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to be handed down through generations and although many fans take up support 
through parent-induced loyalty there will be others who take up the option of forming 
their own allegiance. In that precise sense, there is competition between teams for the 
fan base within a particular area. We already have a variable, Membership, which 
captures what we perceive as ‘first mover advantage’ for long-lived clubs in an area. 
The tradition and reputation of these older clubs form entry barriers for newer clubs to 
develop and sustain their fan base. At present, an example of this is Wigan Athletic 
who only joined the Football League out of semi-professional status in 1978. Located 
in the Greater Manchester conurbation they face competition for fans from 
Manchester United and City and Bolton Wanders to the east and Liverpool and 
Everton to the west. This is likely to be a more difficult obstacle to overcome than the 
local peculiarity that, until recently, the town’s Rugby League team enjoyed greater 
attendances than the football team. 
 
As noted above, the multiplicity of football teams in metropolitan areas stands in 
sharp contrast to the territorial restrictions imposed in North American major league 
sports. The level of competition between clubs is likely to be negatively related to the 
amount of playing talent that can be hired. Indeed, this is an important reason why the 
North American teams invoke their particular restrictions. Here, we hypothesise that 
increased competition between teams will reduce gate attendance, given market size 
and our various control variables.  
 
To measure competition, we could simply count the number of other Premier and 
Football League teams within a specified distance, say 20 miles. Although this would 
be useful we prefer to exploit information from the census of population more 
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precisely. Using Mapinfo, we construct 10 mile radial rings around each club. 
Suppose there are two clubs located within 10 miles of the focus club’s ground. The 
proportion of all people residing within a club’s 10 mile radial ring and within a 10 
mile radial ring of the other club is taken as our measure of competition. Figure 1 
shows an example of overlapping rings for two clubs in our sample, Newcastle and 
Sunderland.  
 
Where there is more than one neighbouring club, we have more than one intersection 
of overlapping rings. In this case, the proportions of overlapping population are 
aggregated and the value of competition may exceed unity. In fact, the value of 
competition ranges from zero to 7.88 with a mean of 1.90 and standard deviation of 
2.37. The highest value occurs for Arsenal, revealing the intensity of competition for 
fans in the Inner London area. Tottenham Hotspur, located close to Arsenal, have the 
next lowest value at 7.76. 
 
Our measures of market size and competition are entered into our model separately for 
home and away teams in a particular fixture. This is consistent with our treatment of 
our fan support variables. We offer a treatment of market size that is not restricted to 
arbitrary local authority boundaries.7 Moreover our measure of team competition 
overcomes the ad hoc treatment of dividing metropolitan population by number of 
teams as a measure of market size per team that has occurred in some previous studies 
(e.g. Burger and Walters, 2003). The use of GIS methods allows us to model market 
size and competition jointly as explanatory variables in our attendance demand model. 
                                                          
7 For example, Schmidt and Berri (2001) use size of metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) in their study 
of attendance at Major League Baseball games. This is an inadequate proxy for market size as travel 
costs are not homogeneous across cities with different SMSA size. Higher SMSA size does not 
translate into higher market size because travel costs are greater in bigger urban areas. 
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3. Data and  empirical estimation  
 
We need to address the problem that several Premier League clubs regularly 
sell tickets at levels close to ground capacity. This is an awkward problem that must 
be confronted in our empirical estimation. For a high proportion of games in our 
sample, we find that reported attendances are close to stadium capacity. Police 
segregation policies mean that clubs rarely report attendances exactly at capacity 
levels. We define ‘at capacity’ to mean attendance levels at more than 95% of stated 
ground capacity. On this basis, the proportion of censored games in our sample was 
54.6%. Attendance at capacity cannot vary, for the team in question, by construction 
and Ordinary Least Squares estimates will be biased. As an alternative we use Tobit 
estimation. 
 
In our model, stadium capacity is the censoring point and our attendance data are 
right-censored (see Figure 2). Only the data to the left of the censoring point can be 
used for estimation and so we have a truncated normal distribution for our dependent 
variable. The statistical distribution that is relevant for our attendance data is a 
mixture of discrete and continuous distributions representing the probability of a sell-
out crowd and the attendances for games that are not sold out.  
 
Following Greene (2003) we can analyse this mixed distribution by defining a random 
variable, A, which is derived from ‘true’ demand, D, as8: 
A = C if  D ≥ C 
A = D if D < C.         (2) 
                                                          
8 Greene’s explanation of the tobit model is accompanied by a numerical example using stadium 
capacity as the censoring point.  
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Suppose that true demand is normally distributed with mean µ and constant variance 
σ2. Let D = xβ + ε where ε is a random error term. Then the first component of the 
tobit model is the probability of a sell-out crowd which is given by: 
Pr{A = C} = Pr{D ≥ C} = Φ((xβ - C)/σ).                  (3)   
The second component of the tobit model is the distribution of A given that it is below 
capacity. This is a truncated normal distribution with expectation  
E{A|A < C} = xβ + conditional expectation of a mean-zero normal variable, given that 
it is less than xβ – C. We now see why it would be inappropriate to restrict attention to 
games that do not sell out. The conditional expectation of A is not equal to xβ as it 
depends on x in a nonlinear relationship.  
 
There are two extensions that can be readily made to fit our purpose. First, the 
censoring values can be made to vary across clubs as these have different stadium 
capacities. Secondly, we can estimate a random effects tobit model. This specifies 
true demand for game i hosted by team j at time t as  
Dit = xitβ + αj + εit             (4)  
 The random effects model specifies a set of team-specific constant terms that are 
randomly distributed across teams. We are assuming here that the team-specific 
effects are strictly uncorrelated with the regressors. 
 
The coefficients generated by the random effects tobit model cannot be interpreted as 
impacts as would be the case in a linear regression model. Suppose we obtain a 
coefficient of β1 on a variable x1. Then we can obtain the marginal effect on the 
expected value of A of a change in x1 as 
∂E{A}/∂x1 = β1Φ((xβ – C)/σ)        (5) 
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This gives the marginal effect of a change in x1 upon the expected attendance A as the 
estimated coefficient multiplied by the probability of the game not being sold out. If 
this probability is one for a particular game then the marginal effect reduces to β1 as in 
the linear model. Below, we report marginal effects rather than coefficients from our 
tobit estimates. 
 
Attendance data were compiled from editions of the Sky Football Yearbook 
(previously the Rothmans Football Yearbook). Financial data were obtained from the 
Deloitte and Touche Annual Review of Football Finance. Descriptive statistics for our 
variables are shown in Table 1. It is apparent that matchday attendances are widely 
dispersed so there is considerable variation in our dependent variable to be explained 
by our model. Allowing for some small amount of missing information on financial 
data, we have a sample size of 2,553 of which 1,394 games are designated as 
censored. Our sample period is 1996/97 to 2003/04 and we therefore have a 
substantial unbalanced data set. The context for our study is a period of growth in 
Premier League attendances, sufficiently strong for several clubs (e.g. Arsenal, 
Liverpool, Manchester City, Southampton) to contemplate moving to larger stadia to 
release existing capacity constraints.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Results from our random effects tobit estimation are shown in Table 2. We  
should first note the absence of outcome uncertainty. This was included initially and 
as the coefficient was found to be not significantly different from zero we dropped 
this variable from the final results. Failure to find any significant role for outcome 
 16
uncertainty is not a new finding in the sports economics literature. For example, 
Baimbridge et al. (1996) found no significant effect of a measure of outcome 
uncertainty based on absolute differences in league rankings in their study of Premier 
League football in the 1993/94 season (although they did not use tobit estimation).9
 
Our reported t-statistics will be understated, inference will be undermined and our 
estimates will be inefficient if the error term does not have constant variance. To test 
for unequal variance in the error term (heteroskedasticity) we apply the Goldfield-
Quandt test (Greene, 2003). Our dataset is partioned into three based on the 
magnitude of the following variables: home team’s prior season attendance, home 
team’s relative wage and current performance of the home team. The variances of the 
error terms from regression models of the partitions were tested for equality. The 
Goldfield-Quandt test did not reject equality of variance of the error term.    
 
Control variables 
From our set of team support variables, it appears that habit persistence is strong 
within the Premier League since home team attendance is positively related to average 
attendance last season for both home and away teams. This applies to both incumbent 
and promoted teams. Tradition and reputation as proxied by home team league 
membership appear to be significant determinants of attendance. However, away team 
league membership does not have a significant effect on attendance. Distance affects 
matchday attendance in a non-linear fashion as found in other studies (Forrest, 
                                                          
9 See Borland and Macdonald (2003) for some studies on other sports which find a similar result. 
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Simmons and Szymanski, 2004). Derby matches involving keen local rivalry raise 
attendances, other things equal, by 6.0 per cent.10  
 
In our set of team quality measures, home team and away team wage bill have 
significant coefficients of almost equal magnitude, suggesting that fans react to total 
quality of teams in a match when deciding to attend. We see that improved quality of  
an away team does have a positive impact on home attendance. If a typical away team 
improves its team quality by raising relative wage bill by 45 per cent (an increase of 
one standard deviation), home gates improve by 1.3 per cent according to our results, 
ceteris paribus.  A slightly smaller effect can be found by raising home team’s 
relative wage bill by the same order of magnitude.  
 
We find that home team performance, as measured by points per game to date of 
match, has a positive and significant (at 1 per cent) effect on attendance. This is in 
line with prior expectations. But away team performance does not have a significant 
effect on attendance. Away team attributes that impact on gates are to be found 
elsewhere in the relative wage bill and distance variables. 
 
The set of broadcasting variables gives clear evidence that live telecasts of Premier 
league games does reduce attendance, with the exception of games televised on public 
holidays. We find that live broadcasting on Sundays, the most popular slot for 
viewers, reduces gate attendance by 7.6 per cent, other things equal11. Taking account 
of the general loss in attendance for weekday games (4.7 per cent) we find that games 
                                                          
10 Impacts of dummy variables are shown using the formula exp (βx) – 1 where β is the estimated 
coefficient. 
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broadcast on Monday nights are associated with 6.3 per cent lower attendance, ceteris 
paribus.    
 
Market size and competition 
Our results reveal a positive impact of market size on gate attendance, as expected. 
After experimentation with sizes of concentric rings, we find that the population 
located in rings outside a 10 radius from the home team stadium does not contribute 
significantly to attendance.12 Our key result, then, is that a 100 per cent increase in 
population within 10 miles of a ground raises gate attendance by 11.5 per cent. Put 
another way, consider two teams that are otherwise identical as specified by control 
variables. Then if one team has a population within 10 miles that is 100,000 greater 
than the other team, the team with larger population density is predicted to have 0.79 
per cent greater attendance. At mean attendance, we estimate that this converts to 
£151,000 extra revenue per season.  
 
We also find that away teams with greater population density near their grounds 
generate additional attendance. A 100 per cent larger away team population is 
associated with a 2.8 per cent greater attendance.13 Alternatively a difference in away 
team population of 100,000 translates into an increase in attendance of 0.32 per cent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Forrest, Simmons and Buraimo (2005) report results from a probit model of selection of Premier 
League games by Sky. In the second half of a season Sky has unrestricted choice of which games to 
broadcast and does tend to focus on matches involving teams higher up the League table.  
12 The use of a 10 mile radius is consistent with Forrest, Simmons and Feehan (2002) who found that 
the majority of home fans travelled within this distance. Travel costs are reasonably homogeneous 
within this zone. 
13 We lack data on numbers of away fans inside home stadia and so we cannot distinguish between the 
impacts of away team market on numbers of fans who travel and on attractiveness of larger away teams 
to home supporters. 
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Larger population centres tend to be associated with a greater number of competing 
teams. London and Greater Manchester, in particular, have several clubs competing 
within a 20 mile radius.  The coefficients on home competition and away competition 
are each negative and significant at 5 per cent.  As the degree of competition increases 
within both the home and away team markets, attendance is predicted to fall. But 
while larger markets do attract increased competition for fan base from rival teams, 
we find that this does not entirely eliminate the advantages of greater market size. If 
home competition is removed from the model, the marginal effect on home market 
size is reduced to 0.064.      
 
Looking at away team characteristics, we find that the benefits of larger market size 
of an away team are again only partially offset by the significant, negative effect of 
increased competition for fans by means of a greater number of clubs in the away 
teams’ localities. 
 
An important implication of our results is that team relocation to stadia in out-of-town 
greenfield sites is predicted to result in loss of support as market size is reduced. Take 
the example of Bolton Wanderers who moved from Burnden Park in the centre of 
Bolton to a newly built stadium in Horwich, three miles away from the town centre 
and with lower population density. Setting control variables at their mean values, we 
find that the predicted reduction in average home attendance for Bolton is 1,278 per 
game. Using a Premier League average ticket price of £30 in 2003/04, the reduction in 
seasonal gate revenue for Bolton from its out-of-town site is then estimated at 
£728,460. Of course, in recent seasons Bolton have finished in the top half of the 
Premier League and have qualified for the UEFA Cup but this merely highlights the 
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importance of controlling for other factors when undertaking multivariate analysis. Of 
itself, a change in stadium from inner city to suburbs or out-of-town sites is predicted 
to reduce gate attendance.14
 
An example of a stadium move which took a club to a location with greater 
population density is Manchester City. Their move to the City of Manchester Stadium 
to the east of Manchester is predicted to raise gate attendance by a modest 91 per 
game. Arsenal’s new stadium is located close to their old location at Highbury in 





We have modelled Premier League matchday attendances over the period 1997- 
2004 using a large panel data set. We have constructed a suitable set of control 
variables and have overcome the problems caused by sell-out crowds by use of tobit 
estimation. We have also accounted for unobserved influences on attendance by 
means of random effects attached to home teams. Our treatment of market size, with 
its use of GIS techniques, is more sophisticated than in previous attendance demand 
studies and would merit application in studies of other sports leagues. 
 
Our main result is that, subject to other controlling influences, teams located in bigger 
markets are able to generate higher gate attendances than those in smaller markets. 
Competition between clubs for the fan base in particular region is a partially offsetting 
                                                          
14 However, offsetting the reduction in marker size is a possible honeymoon effect as fans sample the 
new stadium (Coates and Humphreys, 2005, Leadley and Zygmont, 2005). 
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influence. Our results support the fundamental proposition of various sports 
economists (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Késenne, 1999) that disparities in team 
performance ultimately reflect differences in playing talent that are in turn due to 
variations in market size. A companion paper, Buraimo, Forrest and Simmons (2005), 
follows through and tests the implication of this argument. In the long-term, team 
performance is predicted to depend on market size. That proposition is also upheld in 
these authors’ empirical work. Here, we have checked the first step in the process 
linking market size to team performance. Essentially, teams with larger market size 
have the potential to convert a greater fan base into greater gate, and other, revenues 
so as to generate resource to invest in player talent. Competition between teams for 
the fan base in a region plays a negative, offsetting role in the determination of gate 
attendance but does not totally eliminate the benefits of greater market size. 
 
We offer two problems which we regard as worthy of further research. First, how is it 
that some large metropolitan areas have football teams with systematically weak 
performance? Birmingham, Bristol and Sheffield are possible areas to consider as 
these appear to have underperforming clubs.15 Second, how do changes in population 
over time, through births, deaths and migration, impact upon disparities in market size 
between clubs. Our analysis has used 2001 census data. It would be interesting to 
compare our results from similar models constructed using the 1991 and earlier 
censuses to see how the dynamics of market size have impacted upon team 
attendances, revenues and performance (Dobson and Goddard, 1995, 2001). A highly 
relevant research question is whether disparities in market size have increased for 
football teams over the two census periods. This would cast much light on the critical 
                                                          
15 In France, the absence of a successful club in Paris needs explanation. 
 22
policy question of the optimal degree of cross-subsidisation that the Premier League 
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Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Variable  Mean Std Min Max 
Attendance 32693 11246 7688 67757 
Average home attendance last 33001 11041 15099 67602 
Average away attendance last 31137 11403 11407 67602 
Promoted* average home attendance last 21109 7455 11407 38745 
Promoted* average away attendance last 21109 7455 11407 38745 
Home membership 98 17 20 115 
Away membership 97 17 20 115 
Distance 140 82.40 0.00 347 
Derby 0.05 0.22 0.00 1 
Home relative wage 1.00 0.45 0.28 2.83 
Away relative wage 1.00 0.46 0.28 2.83 
Home points 1.36 0.53 0 3 
Away points 1.38 0.53 0 3 
Sunday TV 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Monday TV 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Bank Holiday TV 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Other TV 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Weekday 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Bank holiday 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Home market size 14.19 0.79 12.39 15.39 
Away market size 14.19 0.79 12.39 15.39 
Home competition 3.10 2.77 0.00 7.88 




Table 2. Tobit model for Premier League attendance. 
Explanatory Variables Marginal effect t statistic 
Log average home attendance last 0.5420 25.77 
Log average away attendance last 0.0827 4.89 
Promoted* log average home attendance last 0.0147 12.37 
Promoted* log average away attendance last 0.0048 4.37 
Home membership 0.0032 12.51 
Away membership 0.0000 -0.17 
Distance -0.0006 -3.72 
Distance2 0.0000017 2.99 
Derby 0.0577 2.92 
Home relative wage 0.0656 4.71 
Away relative wage 0.0889 6.44 
Home points 0.0521 6.69 
Away points 0.0097 1.24 
Sunday TV -0.0728 -5.30 
Monday TV -0.1038 -6.12 
Bank Holiday TV -0.0281 -0.76 
Other TV -0.0446 -2.30 
Weekday -0.0460 -4.14 
October 0.0166 1.21 
November 0.0335 2.47 
December 0.0316 2.57 
January 0.0309 2.33 
February 0.0549 3.82 
March 0.0438 3.26 
April or May 0.0740 6.60 
1998-99 0.0113 0.84 
1999-2000 -0.0966 -7.58 
2000-01 -0.0918 -7.23 
2001-02 0.0599 4.29 
2002-03 -0.0063 -0.42 
2003-04 0.0105 0.68 
Bank holiday 0.0278 1.79 
Home market size 0.1146 8.80 
Away market size 0.0277 2.07 
Home competition -0.0242 -6.19 
Away competition -0.0082 -2.19 
Constant 1.4874 4.82 
Log likelihood 100.2241 
N  2553 
Censored observations 1394 
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